to increase their market share by bidding away sales from the United States.
The behavior of the United States in the grains markets has important implications for all other exporters. As long as the United States, or any other country, behaves like the price leader, others can export at the price it sets. This opportunity has been used to advantage by Argentina in wheat and coarse grains, by South Africa in coarse grains, and by China and Pakistan in rice.
The
Grain exports are dominated by a few countries. In 1979-81 the Characteristics five largest exporters in each market provided almost three-fourths of of Grains the world's rice exports, more than nine-tenths of wheat exports, and Exporters about seven-eights of coarse grain exports. The United States was the largest exporter (see table 1 ). This dominance by a few countries has led various writers to describe the grain markets as oligopolistic, with price leadership provided by one or more of the big exporters. McCalla (1966) characterized the world wheat market as a duopoly between Canada (the price leader) and the United States. Alaouze, Watson, and Sturgess (1978) defined the wheat market as a triopoly of the United States, Canada, and Australia. Bredahl and Green (1983) suggest a model for coarse grain exports, in which the United States is the residual supplier.
The structure of the grain markets acquires increased significance during a period, such as now, when stocks are high and prices low. The behavior of each big participant then becomes more important to the others. With a perfectly competitive market, all exporters will share Rice, Wheat, or Coarse Grains, 1979-81 equally the burden of holding stocks, and market shares may remain nearly constant. With certain types of oligopoly, however, the stockholding burden will fall disproportionately on some exporters, with the possibility of unintended stock build-ups and changing market shares. Among the main exporters, the United States has carried a growing proportion of world grain stocks in recent years. Its wheat stocks rose to an average of 38.1 percent of the world total in 1981-84, compared with a 1970-80 average of 28.1 percent. For the same periods, U.S. coarse grain stocks averaged 58 percent of the total, compared with 43.3 percent, and its rice stocks increased to 8 percent, compared with 3.6 percent. By contrast, Canada, the second largest wheat exporter, held an average of 4.7 percent of world wheat stocks in 1981-84, compared with 15.4 percent in 1970-80. Argentina, the second largest coarse grain exporter, held less than 1 percent of world stocks during the entire period. Thailand, the largest rice exporter, has decreased its share of world stocks from 7.8 percent in 1970-80 to 6.4 percent in -84 (USDA 1984 .
Was this build-up of stocks by the United States a deliberate policy? This article will suggest that market structure and market behavior have been an overlooked cause of the fall in U.S. exports since 1981 and the rise in U.S. stocks. It develops the familiar argument that the rise of the dollar caused the decline in U.S. exports. Chatlin and Lee (1983) , for example, attribute at least half of the decline of U.S. exports in 1982 and 1983 to the strength of the dollar. Schuh (1984) goes further, crediting the export boom of the 1970s to changes in the value of the dollar. Other analysts-including Chambers and Just (1982) , Tweeten (1983) , and Hathaway (1983)-also suggest a strong causal relationship between the dollar and U.S. agricultural exports. This article argues that it was not the exchange rate alone that led to the fall in U.S. exports and the rise in stocks. The structure of the grains markets and the market behavior of the United States allowed other exporters to displace U.S. exports.
Most research has focused on the determination of market structure, rather than the quantification of market behavior. However, with an oligopoly, pricing and exporting behavior can vary greatly. This article concentrates on market behavior and estimates short-run export functions for the major grain exporters.
An oligopoly exists when there is more than one seller, but few oligopoly enough that any seller can influence the market. Because of the small and Price numbers, each seller is expected to be aware of the actions of its rivals Leadership and of their reactions to changes in its own actions. In such a market many different outcomes are possible, ranging from competition to collusion.
If the firms in an oligopolistic industry collude, a cartel could form. Consider the case in which all firms belong to a simple cartel. The curves of market demand and cartel supply are shown in figure 1 as D and S, respectively, and marginal revenue by MR.
Figure 1
The cartel will maximize its members' profit by Price equating supply (or marginal cost) and marginal revenue, selling Q, at price P,. By contrast, a perfectly S competitive market would produce quantity Q* at price pvr The cartel would have to allocate Q, P_ / among its members. It might do so through nonprice competition, each firm being allowed to sell as much as it can at the set price; firms would then differentiate themselves in their services-as happened, for example, in the U.S. airline industry before dere-
gulation. An alternative method of market sharing 00 °-
Quantity
would be through awarding quotas to each member of the cartel. Another outcome of oligopoly is price leadership by one or a few suppliers. Suppose the market consists of one dominant firm and several smaller firms. The dominant firm may decide to set the market price and let the small firms sell all they can at that price. The small firms will behave as perfectly competitive suppliers, regarding their demand curve as perfectly elastic at the price set by the market leader. For the dominant firm, the problem is to fix a price that maximizes profits while allowing the small firms to sell as much as they wish. This is illustrated in figure 2 , where market demand is Total sales will be Q + Q= Q 3 . For a more detailed discussion, see Schmitz and others (1981) . This price leadership model, which emphasizes price leadership and the granting of market access by the dominant firm to smaller ones, is a fair characterization of the world grain markets. The United States is the largest exporter. It sets a price range according to its government programs, allowing price to fall as low as the loan rate,' after which grain is bought for storage. If the price rises above a certain level, stocks are released back onto the market. Other exporting countries seem to have great latitude over how much they sell. This model is consistent with the term "residual supplier" that is often used about the United States (see Bredahl and Green 1983) . The testing of this hypothesized behavior is Figure 3 described in the next section.
price

S
The small firm in the price leadership model is a ESS price taker. It accepts the world price set by the dominant firm and maximizes its profits by produc-P \ ing up to the point where supply equals world price. In figure 3 , domestic supply is shown by Ss and is assumed to be perfectly inelastic within a given mar- (and assuming the domestic price is equal to the world price), domestic demand is Q, and exports are Q 3 (which is also Q 2 -QQ).
The market leader's behavior differs from that of the small supplier because the former faces a downward-sloping demand curve. Its profit-maximizing behavior will be to equate excess supply with marginal revenue of the world demand that remains after exports from the small supPrice pliers. This is shown in figure 4 . The dominant country will export Q, which equates its marginal revenue, MRD ' with its excess supply curve, ESd, at a price P 1 .
However, if a price floor is introduced-as in the 
Supply Model
as perfectly competitive suppliers, responding only to the level of export prices and to domestic demand and supply. Neither the absolute level of world demand nor the exports of other countries should be important in determining their exports. By contrast, the dominant exporter will be strongly influenced by changes in world demand because it faces the demand that is left over after exports from the small countries. The excess supply curve for a small country can be formulated as:
where ESs is the excess supply curve; Ss is the domestic supply (production plus opening stocks); and D. is the domestic demand (including stock demand). A simply functional relationship, with a predetermined supply in a given year, can be specified as:
and domestic demand equal to:
where Z denotes a set of variables such as population and income, and P is the export price. Restating:
The excess supply of the small countries depends on only domestic variables and the export price P. For the dominant country, the excess supply function is identical to that of a small country when the world market price is the competitive solution. However, when the price is set above this level, as happens when the U.S. loan rate becomes a price floor, then the dominant firm's excess supply schedule becomes:
where P is the oligopoly world market price and PF is the price floor.
The exports of the market leader will depend on the quantity demanded by the world market after exports from the small suppliers. Since world demand does not affect the small countries, the distinction provides a basis for testing the market behavior of exporters. A two-stage decision process will be assumed for exports. First, the level of domestic demand is determined; in the second stage, the levels of exports and closing stocks are determined. This is a realistic description, because many countries isolate their domestic markets from the world market. 2 The small-country supply of exports becomes:
(1) Xs = f [(Ss-Dy) 
, P]
The dominant-country supply is obtained by extending equation (1) as follows:
where TD is the sum of world exports.
The statistical results from equations (1) and (2) will reveal a country's export behavior. If the behavior is explained satisfactorily by equation (1), without the need to include information on world demand as in (2), then the country has indeed acted as a smallcountry exporter. However, if equation (2) provides a significantly better explanation of exports, then the country has behaved as a market leader.
Equation (1) can be extended to include a lagged dependent variable to test for the effects of long-term contracts, which are a common feature of trade in grains. This extension yields the following: Xd-l] The three equations were estimated for rice, wheat, and coarse grains for the five largest exporting countries in each market. 3 
Rice
For rice, the results in table 2 support the price leadership model; the level of world imports is statistically significant only in the export equation for the United States. For other exporters, the level of world demand is not statistically significant in explaining their exports.
The export price of rice is not a significant explanatory variable in most of the export equations. Equation (3) had a positive and significant coefficient for Japan at the 10 percent level; equation (1) had a positive and significant coefficient at the 1 percent level for China. However, equations (2) and (3) did not show a significant result for China. The export elasticity for Japan for equation (3) was 1.39, and the world export elasticity based on Japan's 1979-81 market share was 0.08. The export availability variable is significant at the 10 percent level or higher in every equation except for China and always has the expected sign. The estimated coefficient is between zero and one, as expected, for all exporters except Pakistan. The coefficient for Pakistan is probably biased upward as it reflects a trend to smaller rice stocks and larger wheat stocks, as local consumption shifted 0 Note: For each variable, the estimated coefficient is listed first; the t statistic and elasticity are below the coefficient, respectively. Statistical significance is denoted as ('* ) for 0.01, (' ') for 0.05, and ('") for 0.10 levels of significance, respectively. a. Production + beginning stocks -domestic consumption. b. U.S. export price x exchange rate + consumer price index of exporting country. c. The Durbin-Watson statistic is denoted DW, and the H test for serial correlation when a lagged dependent variable is present is denoted H. d. The estimation procedure for each equation is indicated by OLS for ordinary least squares and by COR for corrected for first-order serial correlation. e. The deflated U.S. export price was used for China because no data were available for the Chinese consumer price index. strongly away from rice and toward wheat. The result for China suggests that the decision to export is not based on the availability of rice, but on other factors. The lagged rice net export variable was statistically significant at the 10 percent level or higher in four of the five countries estimated under equation (2), but in only one country under (3). This variable should be positive and significant if a country has a partial adjustment scheme or if long-term contracts are important in explaining rice exports. The results are mixed; only Japan shows strong evidence of partial adjustment or the use of long-term contracts.
Wheat
The equations for wheat are shown in table 3 for the five major exporters. Equation (3) seems to provide results consistently superior to the other equations, based on the fit shown by the R 2 . The estimated coefficient on the level of world imports was statistically significant at the 1 percent level for the United States and Canada and at the 5 percent level for Australia. It was not significant for Argentina and the European Community (EC). The coefficients are nearly equal to the historical market shares of the exporters, suggesting relatively stable shares for the United States, Australia, and Canada. The coefficient for the United States was 0.43, close to its historical market share over the period. The coefficient for Canada, 0.15, was also nearly the same as its historical share. However, the coefficient for Australia was 0.05, compared with its historical market share of approximately 12 percent: Australia may therefore have been a small exporter over part of the period, becoming a dominant member of the oligopoly only in recent years. (Fitting the same equation over 1970-81 supports this view; the estimated coefficient is 0.14.) As for the EC, it has been a net wheat exporter only since 1974, so the export equation was estimated over 1974-81. This gave a coefficient of 0.06, but the results were not statistically significant.
For all three equations, the amount of wheat available for export was statistically significant at the 1 percent level in explaining the exports of the EC, Australia, and Argentina. The results show that their exports were influenced by availability. The estimated coefficients for the EC, Australia, and Argentina for equation (3) were 0.65, 0.49, and 0.87, respectively. By contrast, the equivalent coefficients for the United States and Canada were not significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. Neither country would have increased its wheat exports even if supplies had been available.
Only the United States had a significant positive price response to world prices. The export elasticity for U.S. exports was 0.31 computed at the means, and the world export elasticity based on the U.S. market share in 1979-81 was 0.14. The other exporters all had an insignificant or perverse response to world prices. However, a price response cannot be ruled out, because their domestic demand could respond to the world price and thus alter the amount of wheat they had for export. This effect would not be reflected in the equations because of the two-stage procedure used. However, national policies that insulate the domestic market from the world market make the supply of exports more inelastic than it otherwise would be.
The partial-adjustment hypothesis found little backing from the wheat market. Under equation (3), none of the exporting countries had a positive and statistically significant response to lagged exports. Under (2), the EC and Australia have a response significant at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. In summary, the price leadership model receives weak support from the estimated equations for wheat. Only Argentina and the EC show signs of behaving as small exporters. The others-the United States, Canada, and Australia-appear to have an implicit market-sharing arrangement, a result consistent with the findings of Alaouze, Watson, and Sturgess (1978) . However, the United States and Canada depend more than Australia on the level of world demand for their exports. The EC, Australia, and Argentina have been able to export a significant part of their production irrespective of world demand. Given Canada's inability to ignore world demand, it seems odd that its exports were nonetheless unresponsive to prices. The insignificant coefficient on available supplies suggests that extra supplies were not constraining exports, but yet higher prices did not increase exports. Perhaps exogenous factors, such as shipping capacity or weatherrelated shipping delays, have been an important determinant of Canadian exports. This possibility is supported by Spriggs and McKinzie (1980) .
Coarse Grains
As table 4 shows, U.S. exports were heavily influenced by the level of world demand. Canada's exports were influenced only slightly, and the other countries' not at all. The estimated coefficient on world imports for the United States is 0.69, indicating a stable market share and a close link between world imports and U.S. exports. The U.S. coefficient was statistically significant at the 1 percent level, that for Canada only at the 10 percent level.
The most significant explanatory variable for coarse grain exports was export availability. It is significant at the 1 percent level in every case, except for equation (3) for the United States. For the rest, the estimated coefficients range between 0.5 and 1.0. Argentina has a coefficient only slightly below 1.0, indicating that it exports nearly all For each variable, the.estimated coefficient is listed first; the t statistic and elasticity are below the coefficient, respectively. Statistical significance is denoted as * *) for 0.01, (* *) for 0.05, and (*) for 0.10 levels of significance, respectively. a. Production + beginning stocks -domestic consumption. b. U.S. export price x exchange rate -consumer price index of exporting country. c. The Durbin-Watson statistic is denoted DW, and the H test for serial correlation when a lagged dependent variable is present is denoted H. d. The estimation procedure for each equation is indicated by OLS for ordinary least squares and by COR for corrected for first-order serial correlation. Note: For each variable, the estimated coefficient is listed first; the t statistic and elasticity are below the coefficient, respectively. Statistical significance is denoted as (^ *) for 0.01, (* *) for 0.05, and (:') for 0.10 levels of significance, respectively. a. Production + beginning stocks -domestic consumption. b. U.S. export price x exchange rate -consumer price index of exporting country. c. The Durbin-Watson statistic is denoted DW, and the H test for serial correlation when a lagged dependent variable is present is denoted H. d. The estimation procedure for each equation is indicated by OLS for ordinary least squares and by COR for corrected for first-order serial correlation.
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its output beyond domestic requirements, irrespective of world market conditions. South Africa and Australia exported a smaller proportion of available supplies but were also unaffected by world market conditions. As for export prices, the estimated coefficient for the United States was significant at the 5 percent level for equation (3) and significant at the 1 percent level for (1) and (2). The export elasticity for equation (3) was 0.36 computed at the means, and the world export elasticity was 0.24 based on the 1979-81 market share. The other exporters had an insignificant or perverse response to export price.
There is no firm evidence of a partial adjustment scheme in coarse grain exports. The lagged exports variable is significant and of the correct sign at the 10 percent level only for equation (2) for the United States.
Taking all these factors together, the evidence to support market leader behavior in coarse grains is quite strong. Only the United States was strongly dependent upon world demand to explain exports, and only it had a significant and positive price response and an insignificant coefficient on export availability. Canada shows some signs of sharing market dominance with the United States but also exhibits the characteristics of a small exporter. The other exportersAustralia, Argentina, and South Africa-demonstrate no responsiveness to market conditions. They behave as perfectly competitive exporters, with supply curves that are almost perfectly inelastic.
Recent Policy Changes in the United States
The U.S. farm bill passed in December 1985 may signal a change in U.S. policy that will remove its dominant role. The bill includes a crop-marketing loan provision, which is designed to force grain onto the market rather than into government storage. It would effectively remove the price floor that has been provided by the U.S. loan rate. However, the marketing loan provision is operational only if the secretary of agriculture chooses to use it. It has been adopted for rice, but not for other grains (USDA 1986) . For them, the loan rates were reduced by approximately 25 percent.
The changes in U.S. practice can be viewed in different ways. They may signal only a price change by the United States to bring world demand and supply closer to balance, which could be consistent with the behavior of the dominant firm. Alternatively, it may show that the United States is no longer following the role of the price leader in the oligopoly model. Which of these two descriptions actually applies appears to rest for the moment with the secretary of agriculture. However, an economic explanation for the changes is that they maximize revenue for the United States but were not allowed to occur gradually because of the rigidities of government policy. Sharp reductions were therefore necessary to adjust to the changed market conditions of the past several years. 4 This explanation receives considerable support from what happened in the grain markets in 1982-84 (see table 5 ). Using this information to compute a linear demand curve for world imports for each of the grains, it is possible to compute the residual demand curve faced by the United States. The exercise makes the simplifying assumption of no price response from non-U.S. exporters. The table also shows the import price elasticities faced by the United States during 1982-84: -1.45 for wheat, -1.26 for coarse grains, and -1.15 for rice. The elasticities for wheat and coarse grains were computed at the average world price in 1982-84, which was partially set by U.S. loan rates. Without the loan rate supports, prices would have been lower and so would the elasticities for the United States. The import demand elasticities for rice were computed using the Thai export price, which more accurately reflects the world price in 1982-84 than does the U.S. export price. The U.S. export price was more than twice the Thai price, and U.S. exports were made possible only because of special export programs.
Once loan rates were cut, however, the U.S. import elasticities were reduced: for wheat, from -1.45 to -0.78; for coarse grains, from -1.26 to -0.58 (see the last row in table 5). The U.S. loan rate for rice was not operating as the price floor to the world market and thus had little direct effect on the import elasticity.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the results in table 5. Even though the world import demand elasticities are very low, the residual import demand faced by the United States in wheat, rice, and coarse grains was elastic during 1982-84. As the point of unitary elasticity on the demand curve faced by the United States corresponds with revenue maximization, these results show that the United States was not setting prices at a revenue-maximizing level. The reduction in loan rates can be interpreted as an attempt to reach that objective. Since a dominant oligopolist will never maximize profits on the inelastic portion of its demand curve, it appears that, given current market conditions and the depreciation of the dollar, the United States may have cut its loan rates by more than was needed to maximize revenues. Political pressures to raise loan rates and world prices can therefore be expected.
Abstract
This article develops and tests several models of market behavior over the 1965-81 period to identify the market behavior of each of the five largest grain exporters in rice, wheat, and coarse grains. The results show that the United States has exerted price leadership in the rice and coarse grains markets. The remaining major exporters in these markets have behaved in a manner consistent with a small-country exporter model in which their market demand is perceived to be perfectly elastic at the world price set by the dominant exporter. The results for wheat suggest a shared dominance between the United States, Canada, and Australia, with the European Community and Argentina behaving as small-country exporters.
The short-run export supply curves for the five largest exporters appear to be very unresponsive to price. For rice, only Japan's exports were found to have a significant and positive response to an increase in the world export price. For wheat and coarse grains, only the United States' exports were estimated to be positively and significantly related to the export price.
An important implication of the current market behavior of the major exporters is that the opportunity exists for all other exporters to sell all they can at the world price. However, a significant risk exists that the United States will stop supporting the world price through its loan rate mechanism. A provision for such a change, the crop marketing loan provision, was included in the Food Security Act of 1985 for wheat and coarse grains and has already been implemented for rice.
-Notes
1. The loan rate is the price at which farmers can borrow from the government against their crop. If crop prices rise, the farmers can redeem their crop and sell it to repay the loan. If prices do not rise, the crop is retained by the government as full payment of the loan. In many years, the U.S. loan rate becomes a price floor, which supports the U.S. market price and-because of the size of U.S. exports-the world price as well.
2. During some period of the 1960s and 1970s, nearly every major grain exporting country had a two-tier pricing scheme to separate domestic consumer prices from international prices. The European Community has followed a two-tier pricing system for grains since 1967, which maintains domestic prices above world market levels. Both Canada and Australia set wheat prices for domestic consumption at levels that may be above or below world prices, depending on international price movements. Japan maintains a differential between rice prices paid by consumers and prices received by producers by means of large subsidies to farmers. Thailand has maintained low consumer prices for rice by requiring exporters to sell a certain quota in the domestic market. South Africa establishes a domestic maize price to consumers below the producer price. Even the United States has followed a two-tier pricing system at certain times. During the early 1960s and again in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States had a wheat export subsidy that allowed exports to be sold at levels below those in the domestic market. For a review of these various policies, see USDA (1981) .
3. Estimation was carried out using ordinary least squares. Although a simultaneity bias could exist between the level of exports and the world price, this bias will not be a major problem for the small exporters-and may not be significant even for the dominant exporter if prices are set by policies that are unresponsive to changing market conditions. Based on preliminary estimates, the simultaneity problem was not found to be significant.
